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Preface 
The primary goal of the ILO is to contribute, with member States, to achieve full and 
productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people, a 
goal embedded in the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization (2008),
1
 
and which has now been widely adopted by the international community. The integrated 
approach to do this was further reaffirmed by the 2010 Resolution concerning employment 
policies for social justice and a fair globalization.
2  
 
In order to support member States and the social partners to reach this goal, the ILO 
pursues a Decent Work Agenda which comprises four interrelated areas: Respect for 
fundamental worker’s rights and international labour standards, employment promotion, 
social protection and social dialogue. Explanations and elaborations of this integrated 
approach and related challenges are contained in a number of key documents: in those 
explaining the concept of decent work,
3
 in the Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 
122), in the Global Employment Agenda and, as applied to crisis response, in the Global 
Jobs Pact adopted by the 2009 International Labour Conference in the aftermath of the 
2008 global economic crisis. 
The Employment Sector is fully engaged in supporting countries placing employment 
at the centre of their economic and social policies, using these complementary frameworks, 
and is doing so through a large range of technical support and capacity building activities, 
policy advisory services and policy research. As part of its research and publications 
programme, the Employment Sector promotes knowledge-generation around key policy 
issues and topics conforming to the core elements of the Global Employment Agenda and 
the Decent Work Agenda. The Sector’s publications consist of books, monographs, 
working papers, employment reports and policy briefs. 
The Employment Working Papers series is designed to disseminate the main findings 
of research initiatives undertaken by the various departments and programmes of the 
Sector. The working papers are intended to encourage exchange of ideas and to stimulate 
debate. The views expressed are the responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent those of the ILO. 
 
JoséManuel Salazar-Xirinachs 
Executive Director 
Employment Sector 
 
1 See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dgo/download/dg_announce_en.pdf. 
2 See http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2010/110B09_108_engl.pdf.   
3 See the successive Reports of the Director-General to the International Labour Conference: 
Decent work (1999); Reducing the decent work deficit: A global challenge (2001); Working out 
of poverty (2003).   
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Foreword 
One of the key features of the labour market developments observed during the past 
decades throughout the world relates to a phenomenon of labour market segmentation, e.g. 
the division of the labour market into separate submarkets or segments, distinguished by 
different characteristics and behavioural rules. To a large extent, these attributes depend on 
the specific environment in which workers operate. Segmentation may arise from 
particularities of labour market institutions, such as contractual arrangements (permanent 
versus temporary employment), their enforcement (and the resulting informality), as well 
as types of workers concerned (such as migrant, domestic, or dispatch workers).  
While the phenomenon is not new, the job crisis has brought an increasing attention 
to the segmentation/duality issue, especially in Europe. The implications and costs of 
segmentation are multiple, in both economic and social terms: they include wage gaps 
between segments, differences in access to training and social security, as well as in 
working conditions or tenure. Moreover, segmentation implies limited transitions to better 
jobs. The consequences of segmentation also have macroeconomic implications, such as 
lower productivity and higher employment volatility.  
In this context, and as part of its objective of promoting decent work, the ILO 
launched, in 2012, a research programme to better understand how labour market 
institutions affect employment outcomes in both quantitative and qualitative terms. One of 
the main motivations of the research project is to put job quality at the forefront of the 
policy debates, informing the main stakeholders in the world of work of the extent of 
labour market segmentation and its implications for job quality in selected countries. 
Fourteen country studies on labour market segmentation and job quality were provided by 
external country experts, as well as thematic papers on job quality in segmented labour 
markets and the role of labour law, collective bargaining, and improved enforcement. 
These studies were discussed in a scientific Workshop held at the ILO in December 2012 
and used as thematic inputs in a policy-oriented Workshop held at the ILO in April 2013. 
The current paper is one in the series of such country studies. It makes an important 
contribution to the discussion on contractual segmentation of labour markets, providing an 
overview of the institutional setup as well as empirical evidence on the extent of 
segmentation and its implications for various aspects of job quality. The paper also offers a 
policy perspective on the ways to alleviate the negative consequences of segmentation.  
 
  
 
Sandrine Cazes, Corinne Vargha, 
Chief of Industrial and Employment 
Employment Analysis and Research Unit Relations Department 
Economic and Labour Market Analysis 
Department 
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1. Introduction4 
The possibly most important economic challenge in Europe is low economic 
growth in the medium run. Italy is no exception; its labour market is among the least 
performing in Europe. This is should not come as a surprise.  Economic growth has 
been lagging in Italy for some 15 years. According to IMF data, only 3 countries out 
of more than 180 have had lower economic growth than Italy. It is also certainly the 
case that Italy still remains a relatively rich country, with a ratio between private net 
wealth and income that is one of the highest in the world. This wealth, however, is 
concentrated in the top 10 per cent of wealthiest households and, in particular, is held 
by relatively older generations. The disappointing performance of the Italian economy 
is also aggravated by population ageing and sharp fiscal consolidation induced by the 
debt crisis. In such economic context, it is very difficult to offer young generations’ 
relevant opportunities. In fact, in addition to this disappointing growth performance, it 
is important to notice that the Italian social system, its labour market and educational 
system are poorly designed to address the needs of younger generations. All these 
factors combined are causing a rising inter-generational conflict, a conflict that the 
current recession is aggravating even further. This paper provides two main 
contributions. First, it documents how this economic environment affects the level of 
employment and unemployment and the various related features in the Italian labour 
market. Second, it discusses some of the major institutional changes that took place in 
the Italian labour market, how they fostered a dual labour market where young 
generations are heavily burdened and what challenges for policy still remain ahead.  
Figure 1   Quaterly Unemployment Rate 
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4
 Pietro Garibaldi is Professor of Economics at the University of Turin, and Director of 
Collegio Carlo Alberto. He is also Head of Labour Studies at the Fondazione Debenedetti, and 
Research fellow at IGIER Milan, CEPR London and IZA Bonn. 
Filippo Taddei is Assistant Professor at Johns Hopkins University and at Collegio Carlo 
Alberto in Turin. 
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 In the aftermath of the great 2008-09 recession, a new social challenge has 
emerged in Europe. Rising unemployment puts great pressure on existing institutions. 
This is particularly the case in Italy where the unemployment rate has jumped from 
less than 7 per cent at the beginning of 2007 to more than 11.6 per cent in February 
2013. At the same time the employment rate has started falling again breaking a 
streak of yearly increase that started in 1995. In February 2013, the overall 
employment rate fell to 56.4 per cent. 
The surge in unemployment is especially concentrated among the Youth. Almost 
6 million young people under 25 are unemployed in the EU 27; the youth 
unemployment rate stands at 22.4 per cent in the EU-27 (is more than twice the 
overall rate of 10.2 per cent). On top of that there are 7.5 million young people who 
are neither in employment nor in education or training (NEET). Double digit youth 
unemployment is a common feature to most countries. In many European countries 
one out of three young people (between age 15 and 24) are currently without a job. 
Unfortunately Italy belongs to this latter group.  
In 2008 Italian youth unemployment was little less than 20 per cent. Though 
certainly not satisfactory, this level was the result of a decade long fall in the rate. 
Almost five years later, in February 2013, youth unemployment rate is at 37.8 per 
cent. Many commentators argue that youth unemployment data are poorly measured 
and do not capture well the phenomenon they are supposed to quantify. Even if this 
fact were true, youth unemployment is still measured today like it was in 2008 and it 
has almost doubled. This prolonged recession has concentrated most of its hardship 
on the youth. The youth-old age dualism is an essential component of Italian labour 
market and, in order to understand it, it is important to stress the nature of the duality 
in the Italian labour market. We will also point out how the recent changes in the 
Italian labour market are likely to fail to address this dualism.  
By looking at the employment loss and its decomposition in terms of age, 
education and work status in Europe over the last two years, a few key facts seem to 
emerge. First, total employment loss was more than 2 per cent on average. Second, by 
looking at employment losses in terms of age, it is clear that they were largely 
concentrated among young workers. Whereas employment of the oldest workers 
increased, young workers experienced losses of as much as 8 per cent. In terms of 
education, the largest amount of job destruction was concentrated among the less 
skilled workers. Finally, employment losses in terms of work status were mainly 
concentrated among the temporary workers. Whereas workers with an open ended 
contract experienced only small losses, temporary workers experienced losses as large 
as 8 per cent. 
The current rise in youth unemployment follows, in the past years, a large rise of 
temporary and fixed-term employment in Italy, as in a number of European 
countries
5
. Among these countries Italy is one where it is harder to reconcile the sharp 
increase in temporary contracts with workers’ preference for short term positions. 
This segmentation of the Italian labour market, so strong to produce a true duality, is 
more likely to be the result of the combination of two factors.  
First, most of the labour market reforms of employment protection legislation 
(EPL) introduced flexibility at the margin. These reforms, in fact, have substantially 
 
5
 See Chapter 3, Employment in Europe 2010, European Commission for a thorough 
reference. 
3 
deregulated the use of temporary contracts while maintaining stringent firing rules on 
permanent contracts.  
Second, starting from 2001, Italy has been lacking economic growth. The 
transformation of the Italian economy and the sectoral reallocation of employment 
from manufacturing to sectoring do not seem to have played a major role in this 
process. In fact, as Figure 2a shows, temporary contract have steadily increased as a 
share of total employment in both sectors from 1992 to 2011.  During the period 
ranging from 1997 to the second quarter of 2007, the Italian unemployment rate fell 
substantially through what we could refer to as “growthless jobs.”6 Eventually 
though, the lack of growth has made a dent in employment growth. Unemployment 
first stabilized during the period 2001-2007 in which many European countries - Italy 
among them - struggled to adapt their productive structure to the new challenges of 
globalization. Finally, with the start of the great recession in 2007 the largest 
employment losses took place in the part of the economy most exposed to temporary 
contracts: the youth in the countries where the labour market is characterized by the 
most extreme dual structure.  
Figure 2   Average change in youth unemployment 
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6
 See Bertola and Garibaldi (2003) for a review of Italian labour market until 2001. 
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Figure 2a   Contract Type 
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In dual labour markets a large share of temporary contracts, employing for the 
most part young workers, coexists alongside a stock of open ended contract with 
much stricter employment security.  In other words, most of the adjustments over the 
last few years have been borne by the young workers. Figure 2 illustrates that this is 
particularly the case in southern European countries. In these economies youth 
unemployment has increased the most from 2005 to 2011. These are also the 
countries where the levels of employment protection and support between temporary 
and permanent workers differ the most, if compared with other EU countries. 
Whereas the liberalization of temporary contracts boosted hiring and job creation in 
the pre-crisis period in Italy, most of those contracts were not transformed at their 
termination into open-ended ones. This fact has been leading to reduced transition 
rates from temporary to permanent employment, which we document in this study. In 
segmented labour markets, temporary work is often used by firms as a cheaper factor 
of production, taking advantage of the large regulatory gap with respect to permanent 
contracts, rather than as a tool to adjust their production process to the changes in 
economic condition or as a screening device to evaluate the productivity/adequacy of 
new recruits. 
This equilibrium in the Italian labour market provides crucial challenges for 
policy. Addressing them is a particularly daunting task during a crisis as deep and 
prolonged as this one. This calls for a renovated perspective and, in the conclusion of 
this paper, we will put forward few options that could be pondered. The 
disproportionate impact of this "great recession" on temporary - and especially 
young-workers leaves us little time to act with a long term perspective.  
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the main features of the 
Italian labour market, section 3 presents the institutional background and the 
sequence of labour market reforms in the Italy following a European pattern, Section 
4 addresses the major consequences of these reforms with particular attention on the 
segmentation of the Italian labour market, Section 5 discusses the single contract and 
related proposals to address the segmentation of the Italian labour market and Section 
6 concludes. 
5 
2. The Main Features of the Italian Labour Market  
From the early eighties Italy has been an economy with high unemployment rate 
and low employment rate. These features changed starting from1995 and until 2007. 
During this period the Italian unemployment rate fell substantially while the 
employment rate rose from close to 50 per cent to more than 56 per cent.  
Figure 3   Overall Employment Rate 
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Figure 3a   Employment rate by age group 
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6 
During these years the performance of the Italian economy was rather grim, with 
the exception of the years from 1995 to 2000. Given the fact that Italian economy 
grew the least among all OECD countries in terms of GDP per capita from 2001 to 
2007, it is not an overstatement to talk about this period as one in which Italy created 
“growthless jobs”. 
 
Figure 4   Growth in Real GDP per capita -  per cent Annual Rate  
 
Source: OECD 
In Italy employment growth and the subsequent unemployment rise did not 
impact all groups and categories of workers in the same way. It is worthwhile to 
observe that the major transformation of the Italian economy starting from 1995 did 
not overturn the three main divides of its labour market. These divides still remain 
and they can be identified around 3 fault lines: gender, generations and regions. We 
will analyze these in turn. 
The first major divide is gender based. The Italian labour market displays 
impressing differences in the unemployment rates for male and females. Figure 5 
shows that the unemployment rate for women has been closing the gap with the 
unemployment rate for men starting in 1998. This continued until 2008. 
7 
Figure 5   Unemployment rate by gender 
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The difference between the unemployment rate of men and women remains 
sizeable. This is an especially puzzling feature if one compares the behaviour of the 
Italian economy with the average of European Union. Figure 6 displays this 
difference. While the two rates have come to an overlap starting with recession of 
2009 in the European Union, this is not the case in Italy. The gender-based divide 
remains strong in the Italian labour market if we measure it with the crude notion of 
the unemployment rate. 
Figure 6    Unemployment rate by gender: Italy vs. EU average 
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 As we anticipated, this is not the only divide present across Italian workers. The 
second one is possibly stronger and generational in nature.  In 2010 the European 
Commission pointed out that “in industrialised countries, including EU Member 
States, the magnitude of employment creation and destruction flows relative to the 
stock of jobs is large (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2005; Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999). In 
a recent OECD study (2009), covering eleven countries and using harmonized data, 
job turnover rates were estimated at 22 per cent (of total employment) over the period 
1997-2004, and annual average labour turnover rates at 33 per cent (of total 
employment) between 2000 and 2005. According to EU LFS data, youth spend on 
average shorter periods in unemployment between jobs than older age groups and the 
crisis has not changed this feature, although it has increased the average duration of 
the unemployment spells.”7 In the Figures below we show that this fact persisted in 
Europe during the crisis and at least until 2010. Moreover, factors different from age, 
such as gender or education, can be associated with different labour market outcomes. 
All else being equal, women tend to have longer unemployment spells while workers 
with higher, often university, education tend to have shorter spells. 
Figure 7   Time since unemployed by age 
0
5
10
15
20
15-19 20-24 25-54 55+ Total
Source: EU-LFS
Time(in months) since an unemployed
person last worked by age
2008 2010
 
Figure 8    Time since unemployed by age and gender 
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 Chapter 3, Employment in Europe 2010, European Commission. 
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The large number of youth transitions dominates the short duration of the 
intervening unemployment spells, resulting in a decreasing age profile for the 
unemployment rate. This is even more the case in Italy. What is particularly 
interesting about the Italian labour market is how much larger the difference between 
youth unemployment and total unemployment is compared to with the EU average. 
While the Italian unemployment rate has been aligned with the EU27 average over 
the period from 1992 to 2012, Youth unemployment has always been almost 10 per 
cent higher. This difference has been narrowing in 1998 to 2007 but it has been 
increasing after the recession of 2009 to spike up to an unusually high level in 2012.  
 
Figure 9   Unemployment rate by age:  Italy vs. EU 
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A common criticism to this observation comes from the fact that, by 
international ILO standards, youth unemployment is measured on workers ages 
strictly less than 25. This seems a particularly unappealing measure in a country like 
Italy where entry in the labour market is delayed in comparison with most (if not all) 
European countries. Figures 10 and 11 show that the employment rates at 3 and 5 
years after graduation are in Italy among the lowest of the European Union. These 
rates are strictly below the average employment rates. 
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Figure 10   Employment rates of youth (15 to 34) by gender 3 years after leaving education 
  
Source: LFS ad-hoc module 2009 - Entry of young people into the labour market 
  
Figure 11   Employment rates of youth (15 to 34) by gender 5 years after leaving education 
  
Source: LFS ad-hoc module 2009 - Entry of young people into the labour market 
 
In Figure 12 we employ the Labour Force Survey to extract unemployment rates 
of people younger than 28. Only when we focus on workers in the age range 28-37 do 
we see the unemployment rate falling substantially. This leads us to conclude that a 
crucial determinant of the level of unemployment in Italy is what happens among the 
youth in the labour market.  
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Figure 12   Unemployment rate by age 
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Education in principle offers a strong insurance against unemployment. This 
fact is confirmed by Italian data where we observe in Figure 13 that the 
unemployment rate falls with the level of education of the workers. Perhaps more 
surprising is the fact that this is not the case if we focus our attention on the people 
aged less than 35. In this latter group of people unemployment is certainly smaller for 
high school graduate than it is for people with less education. It is instead not always 
the case when we look at people with university education. In Italy, university 
graduates have been experiencing larger unemployment rate than high school 
graduates since 2004. This is shocking and it provides useful information regarding 
the likelihood of a severe skill mismatch in the Italian economy and, most 
importantly, on the sharing of the hardship of the crisis in the Italian labour market. 
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Figure 13   Unemployment rate by education level 
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Figure 14   Unemployment rate by education level: age ≤35 
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The only statistics on which the youth compares favourably with the rest of the 
labour force is given by unemployment duration. By comparing unemployment 
duration, i.e. how long unemployed stay without a job, workers aged less than 36 
appear to have a lower likelihood, though not by sizeable amounts, of being 
unemployed for more than 1 year (Figures 15 and 16). 
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Figure 15   Unemployment rate by duration 
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Figure 16   Length of unemployment: age ≤35 
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 While the crisis has increased the level of youth unemployment and worsened 
overall working conditions, it has preserved the third divide in the Italian labour 
market, the regional one. A substantial degree of heterogeneity in the labour market 
remains across different Italian regions. Both in terms of unemployment and 
14 
employment rates the differences are as large as 15 per cent between the South of the 
country and the most economically active regions (North East (NE) and North West 
(NW)). Figures 17 and 18 illustrate the fact. 
Figure 17   Unemployment rate by region 
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Figure 18   Employment rate by region 
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Source: EU LFS  1983-2011  
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An even more interesting fact is that, possibly not surprisingly, unemployment 
in the south is especially concentrated among the Youth. Figure 19 reports this 
evidence for workers aged between 28 and 37. Similar evidence could be reported 
using other age brackets to identify the youth, even the standard international 
classification (less or equal than 24 year old). 
 
Figure 19   Employment rate by region: age 28-37 
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   Source: EU LFS  1983-2011  
Another factor that seems to play a different role depending on the region of the 
Italian labour market is education. While unemployment rates do not differ 
substantially in the economically performing North, this is not the case in the South 
where lower and secondary education provide substantially larger unemployment 
probability than university education (Figure 20). These differences are reduced if 
one focuses on employment rates (Figure 21). 
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Figure 20   Unemployment rate by education level: NE region 
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Figure 21   Unemployment rate by education level: South region and islands 
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To conclude, we can summarize our discussion by saying that while 
unemployment remains for the most part concentrated among the Youth, the 
likelihood of being unemployed increased substantially if the worker is a woman that 
lives in geographical South of the country. In the remainder of this paper, we would 
like to reconcile at least part of this heterogeneity to the segmentation present in the 
Italian labour market, a segmentation that is so deep as to give rise to a striking 
duality between temporary and permanent contract workers operating within the 
labour market. The study of this duality will be the focus of the analysis that follows. 
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3. Institutional background 
Temporary contracts can ease the transition process between education and the 
working environment. They can facilitate entry in the labour market, particularly in 
those countries where vocational education and training is not sufficiently developed. 
Temporary contracts may also encourage the selection of workers by employers and 
ease a better matching of job requirements to workers' needs/aspirations. However, 
recently, temporary contracts have failed to deliver on their promise and the labour 
markets in several EU member states have been featuring increasing segmentation, 
leading to a dualism where temporary workers fail to find stable and quality 
employment. It is possibly hard to keep workers motivated to work efficiently and to 
look for a job in this institutional setup. These European level dynamics have been 
particularly severe in the Italian economy, especially during the current crisis. We are 
observing larger flows of workers from employment into unemployment and from 
unemployment to inactivity as Figures 22a, 22b and 22c illustrate. 
 
Figure 22a   Flows from employment into unemployment 
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Figure 22b   Flows from employment into Inactive 
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Figure 22c   Flows from unemployment into employment 
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Irrespective of the reason why we observe less workers transitioning from 
temporary to permanent jobs, it is certainly the case that temporary workers are now 
bearing a larger burden because of the crisis. The dualism in the Italian labour market 
has worsened. This term refers, essentially, to the coexistence of workers with stable 
(i.e. long-term) employment relationships and other workers with temporary 
employment contracts. If temporary workers are unable to transition into open ended 
contracts, the consequences may be adverse and long-lasting (Layard, 2005).  
19 
Boeri (2010) argues that labour market dualism results from a specific reform 
strategy with respect to Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). Some countries, 
especially in continental Europe, have enacted numerous reductions of EPL since the 
1980s to curb high and persistent structural unemployment rates. These reforms have 
increased dualism by promoting flexibility at the margin - deregulation of temporary 
contracts and/or the development of agency work and other contracts of limited 
duration (e.g. consulting jobs) - while maintaining existing rules on permanent 
contracts. Figure 15 breaks down changes in the EPL overall indicator from mid-
1980s to 2008 between permanent contracts (bright blue) and temporary contracts 
(dark blue).
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As summarized in Chapter 3 of the “Employment in Europe - 2010”: “in 
countries where permanent contracts represent the most common type of 
employment, governments were often unable to obtain support for reforms that 
weaken dismissal rules for permanent employees, and focused instead on easing the 
regulations on temporary contracts (Saint-Paul, 1999).  Boeri (2010) labels these 
episodes as two-tier reforms”.  
 
3.1. The Case of Italy  
Italy is one of most prominent example of labour market dualism. Over the last 
15 years the Italian labour market underwent a significant reform process. Indeed, 
these reforms are partly responsible for the changes in the composition of the Italian 
labour force highlighted in the previous sections- namely the increase in youth 
unemployment since 2009 and the widespread use of various forms fixed term 
contracts. 
The core of the reform process has been a gradual liberalization of fixed terms 
jobs, alongside an almost unchanged legislation for open ended contracts. Following 
the definition given by the literature on labour market reforms (Boeri 2012), the 
Italian reform process is characterized by a marginal and asymmetric process, 
particularly from a generational standpoint. The reform process of the nineties and 
early two thousands created a labour market that was fairly flexible for the workers 
entering the labour market, namely youth and women. At the same time, prime aged 
workers, belonging to the “breadwinner generation”, were totally insured by the 
reform process.  The reform process was thus marginal - in the sense that it applied 
only to new jobs, and asymmetric - in the sense that affected only a fraction of the 
population. In other words, the reform process acted mainly via the labour market 
flows. 
The three most important piece of legislation up to the great recessions are the 
1997 Pacchetto Treu, the 2001 reforms on fixed term contracts and the Legge 30 in 
2003. 
 
8
 Measured as the change in the overall indicator of EPL strictness calculated by the OECD (OECD, 2004, 
Venn, 2009), excluding rules on collective dismissals. Such indicator is the arithmetic average of two sub-
components, i.e. regulations on dismissals of permanent employees (encompassing severance pay, advance 
notice periods, procedural requirements for dismissals, role of courts) and regulations on the use of contracts 
of limited duration (type of jobs, maximum legal duration, possibility for renewals etc.). Both indicators 
vary from 0 to 6 with a higher score indicating stricter regulations. 
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3.2. Marginal Reforms: Once Again 
The 1997 Pacchetto Treu (Treu Bill) loosened the discipline concerning the 
conversion of fixed-term contract into an open-ended one. In particular, it reduced the 
sanctions in case of violation of the fixed term contracts' discipline. At the same time, 
the Bill allowed the establishment in the Italian labour market of temporary work 
agencies. "Atypical"- in the sense that they are different than the open ended contract 
for regular employee- were also encouraged by reducing social security contributions 
and pension provisions. Further, the transformations of fixed term contracts into 
open-ended ones stopped being automatic and began to require a court ruling. The 
package eased regulation of new apprenticeship (nuovo apprendistato) and work-
training contracts (contratto di formazione lavoro) and sets incentives for on-the-job 
training (stages), temporary work via private agencies (lavoro interinale) and intra-
regional labour mobility (assegni per la mobilità geografica). 
The 2001 reform established a further liberalization of the fixed term contract. 
The reform was based on an EU directive, and was aimed at extending the scope of 
temporary contracts. Technically, starting from 2001, temporary contracts became 
largely allowed as long as the motivation for their use was given in writing. In the 
same years, part time contracts became also more flexible. The disadvantages in 
terms of non-proportional compensation and additional regulation vis-a-vis their full 
time counterpart were gradually lifted.  
In 2003, the legge Biagi introduced various other “atypical” labour contracts. 
While most of these contracts (job on call; job sharing, etc.) turned out to have 
negligible aggregate dimensions over the rest of the decade, the “contratto a 
progetto” deserves special attention. Technically speaking, or de iure,  the contratto a 
progetto refers to a fixed term labour  service provided  by a professional self-
employed to a specific employee for a well-defined “professional project”, i.e. a task 
with predetermined objective and output. De facto, these contracts turned out to play 
a key role in the growing of fixed term relationships of new entrants, and many 
workers end up providing service very similar to those of regular employees. These 
contracts not only were fixed in nature, but they had lower social security 
contributions, did not envisage any maternity of sick leave compensation, and did not 
allow workers to be entitled to unemployment benefits.  The labour market that 
emerged was both dual and unequal, especially from a generational standpoint. The 
increase in the demand for workers’ flexibility was not accompanied by the reform of 
unemployment benefit provision. Such a reform would seem a natural complement of 
the increase in flexibility and its absence contributed to the depth of dualism in the 
Italian labour market. 
In 2005 the total duration of ordinary unemployment benefit was raised from 6 
to 7 months for workers aged less than 50 years and from 9 to 10 months for workers 
aged 50 or more. The level of ordinary unemployment benefits was raised from 40 
per cent to 50 per cent of reference salary for the first six months and was set at 40 
per cent during the seventh month for workers aged less than 50 years. The level was 
raised to 50 per cent of reference wage (from 40 per cent) for the first six months and 
is set at 40 per cent for the following three months and 30 per cent during the tenth 
month for workers aged 50 or more. Definition of the conditions for the immediate 
implementation of those measures (Article 13) of Law 276/2003 which provide for 
incentives to private employment agencies that ensure the insertion or reinsertion in 
the labour market of difficult-to-employ persons (so-called "presa in carico"). To this 
effect, regional governments were no longer required to individually legislate in order 
to bring this measure into effect. 
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Italy was not the only country that underwent these types of reform, but it 
appears one of the countries with the most asymmetric institutional reforms, as 
recently pointed by academics (Boeri (2010)) and policy makers (European 
Commission (2010)).  Figures 23a and 23b show that the change in Employment 
Protection Legislation (EPL) for regular contracts (chEPR) was typically smaller than 
the change of the index for temporary contracts (chEPT). Figure 24 highlights such 
institutional features over time for the Italian economy and disaggregates the 
behaviour of the different components of the EPL index for Italy. Whereas the index 
measuring the protection of regular contracts was largely unchanged, the legislation 
on Italian temporary contracts pushed toward substantial levels of flexibility. 
 
Figure 23a   Change from 1985 to 1998 
 
Figure 23b   Change from 1998 to 2008 
 
Source: EPL data available at www.oecd.org/employment/protection.  
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Figure 24   EPL 
0
2
4
6
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
EPL in Italy
Overall Temporary Regular Collective Dismissal
Source: OECD.Stat 
3.3. The Honeymoon Effects of Marginal Reforms  
The frequency of two-tier reforms highlights the importance of focusing on these 
reforms as opposed to complete ones. In terms of labour market outcome, marginal 
reforms seemed to work fairly well, certainly at the beginning of their 
implementation. As we highlighted in the introduction and Figure 3, between 2000 
and 2008 the Italian labour market expanded consistently, with a declining 
unemployment and a rising employment rate. This aggregate outcome of rising 
employment is consistent with the so called honeymoon effect of marginal reforms, 
highlighted in a contribution by Boeri and Garibaldi (2007). 
In the two-tier system, employers take full advantage of the opportunity to hire 
workers during economic upturns, mostly through temporary contracts to avoid 
paying the firing tax if the economy slows down. The two-tier system between 
temporary and permanent contracts contributes to explaining why dual labour markets 
displayed significant improvements in youth employment prior to the crisis. During 
downturns sizeable job destruction takes place, mainly because temporary contracts 
are not renewed at expiration and workers laid off. Honeymoons are doomed to 
finish: the extensive use of temporary contracts in countries with large differentials in 
the protection of permanent and temporary contracts increases the volatility of 
employment to economic fluctuations, as illustrated by recent developments in a 
number of countries, beginning with Italy. 
In addition to facilitate job creation in the short run, the reform process appeared 
politically viable. The older generation of employees appeared substantially isolated 
from any legislative change and the standard labour contract (with its strong 
employment protection) remained unaltered. Simultaneously, thanks to the new 
flexible labour contracts, the younger generation had the possibility of entering in the 
labour market, albeit with a more flexible system with respect to that of their parents. 
From 1997 to 2006, while population growth was basically negligible, both the total 
number of people in employment and employees increased by more than 2 Million. 
This represented a 10 per cent increase that remains impressive. The average salary of 
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these jobs was also fairly modest and lower than the corresponding salary for regular 
jobs, but the significant labour expansion partly offset the growth in social inequality 
inherent in such reforms. If we consider the post crisis period, we can observe that 
temporary contract are mostly concentrated in the bottom and top quintile of self-
reported income distribution according to the LFS. This fact suggests that there two 
well distinct temporary jobs in the Italian economy: one large group for very 
unskilled individuals that benefit from temporary contracts by taking advantage of 
their unique skills, another one at the other end of the skill distribution where 
temporary contracts are only used to cut labour costs and possibly accommodate 
temporary production needs. 
Figure 24a   Contract type: Poorest quintile 
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Figure 24b   Contract type: Top 30 per cent income distribution 
24.67% 25.93%
75.33% 74.07%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2009 2011
Contract Type
Top 30% Income Distribution
Permanent Contract
Temporary Contract
 
Data source: EU LFS  1983-2011 
24 
The older generation appeared also protected in terms of social security reforms. 
Italy had introduced a contribution based social security reform back in 1995. 
Nevertheless, its transition phase was extremely slow and was not expected to enter 
into a full regime until 2025. Over the past decade there were some attempts to 
tighten and delay the retirement age, but they were not successfully and were always 
relatively mild. Up to 2012, the effective retirement age in Italy remained around 60 
years of age.  
3.4. The Double Recession and the Monti-Fornero Reforms 
In the aftermath of the financial crises, Italy experienced two deep recessions. In 
2009 GDP fell by 5 percent, it shortly recovered in 2010 and it started falling again 
well into 2013. These deep recessions showed clearly that the marginal approach to 
reforms was far too asymmetric. As we highlighted in the introduction, youth 
unemployment almost doubled since 2008, and it is now as high as 37.8 per cent. The 
ratio between youth and total unemployment is above 3 and it is the highest among 
EU countries. 
With the advent of the Monti government in the Fall 2011, the reform process 
gained new impetus, particularly so in the area of social security. The pension reform 
of December 2011 was indeed fairly bold. The transition to a contribution based 
system (whose idea was dated 1995) was dramatically accelerated. In addition, any 
provision for early retirement was basically removed. The older generation- largely 
untouched by the marginal reform process- was significantly hit for the first time in 
twenty years.  
The pension reform turned out to have a significant aggregate impact on the 
labour market. In Italy, large firms have traditionally used early retirement as a soft 
way to downsize their labour force. Through a variety of agreements with the unions, 
firms managed to negotiate smooth exit of their older workforce directly into early 
retirement. The sudden elimination of early retirement - albeit perfectly desirable 
from the standpoint of social security - delivered dramatic effects on the labour 
market. On the one hand, more than 150,000 (estimate) workers suddenly ended up 
with no job, no unemployment benefits and no pensions. The government had to 
intervene with ad hoc measure to save the so called esodati (those undergoing an 
exodus). On the other hand, as firms could no longer use the soft exit into early 
retirement as a downsizing policy, many firm-level agreements that had already been 
signed lost a key support. In fact, many workers had accepted to resign from their job 
under the promise that the firm would pay their salary until early retirement. As the 
reform cancelled the possibility to retire early, these agreements between firms and 
workers left some workers with the prospect of a period without a job and pension 
benefit. This is the question of the so called esodandi which, at the time of writing, 
remains still unresolved. 
The other major reform of the Monti Government was the labour reform of June 
2012 under the supervision of Minister Fornero. This is, as we shall argue below, 
probably a missed opportunity.  Up to this moment, it does not seem to have 
particularly changed any feature of the Italian labour market, though it is too early for 
a fair and complete assessment.  The reform addressed various dimension of the 
labour market, i.e. the legislation on temporary contracts, the legislation of the regular 
contracts, and unemployment benefits.   
Temporary contracts are now marginally more stringent, particularly in some 
technical requirement of the contratto a progetto as well as in the minimum time of 
unemployment necessary to subscribe subsequent temporary contracts with the same 
employee. There was also some reordering of unemployment benefits, but various 
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institutions that affect different workers in different sectors (liste di mobilità) will 
remain in place until 2017. The most significant reform effort - from the political 
standpoint - has been an attempt to modify the employment protection of currently 
employed workers.  Under the current legislation, employees in firms with more than 
15 employees are entitled to reinstatement in the case of unfair dismissal, through the 
so called “Article 18” of the Labour Code (Statuto dei Lavoratori).  
3.3. The Debated Articolo 18 
In the Italian labour law the protection against unfair dismissal is based on 
Article 18 of the Italian Labour Code (Statuto dei Lavoratori). According to this piece 
of legislation, a worker that is dismissed unfairly is entitled to a full reinstatement into 
the workplace. Inevitably, the ultimate decision in terms of fairness versus unfairness 
of a specific dismissal rests with a court trial and a judge ruling. Until June 2012, 
once a judge ruled the dismissal unfair, the worker had the right of being reinstated. 
Alternatively, the worker had the option of being compensated with 15 months of 
salary, in addition to any foregone salary from the time of the dismissal to the time of 
the sentence.  Since June 2012, through the so called Fornero reform, under specific 
circumstances such a choice is given to the judge. In other words, the judge can now 
avoid a full reinstatement and opt for a monetary compensation that can be as large as 
27 months of salary. It is certainly too soon to provide any serious evidence of 
whether such marginal change in the legislation provided any substantial change in 
the functioning of the Italian labour market.  
At a more general level, it has proved very difficult to provide hard econometric 
evidence of the effect of Article 18 on the labour market. The cases that actually end 
up in court are a very limited proportion of the total firm initiated separation. Indeed, 
most separation goes through a bargaining between the firm and the worker (mediated 
by the union) that is typically resolved with a monetary compensation and an 
agreement to avoid a court ruling. Nevertheless, in the general perception the court 
ruling is typically perceived as very long, very costly, and somewhat random. While 
it is difficult to find proper evidence on these procedural costs, one possibility is to 
look into the cross country difference in court behaviour. Ichino et al. (2012) recently 
looked closely into the trials for unfair dismissal in three large cities (Milano, Roma 
and Torino) in the years 2003-2005. They closely inspected more than 3500 trials in 
Rome, 6500 in Milano and 1736 in Torino. They report two main findings. First, the 
average length of the cases is always larger than 6 months. Second, there is huge 
cross-city heterogeneity in the length of trials, from approximately 7 months in 
Torino to more than 15 in Rome. The difference is indeed remarkable and suggests 
that the existing protection -as perceived by the general public- really involves 
elements of randomness and uncertainty.  
Indirect econometric evidence of the effect of Article 18 is based on the fact that 
its provision applies only to firms and establishments with more than 15 employees. 
Such threshold effects have been studied by Garibaldi et al (2004) and Schivardi and 
Torrini (2008). They find that the effects of Article18 are statistically significant on 
the job separation but quantitatively small. Overall, the evidence suggests that passing 
the threshold reduces the mobility of firms by some 2 percent. The size distribution of 
firms -similarly- does not provide any particular discontinuity between 15 and 16 
employees. One of the reasons why Article 18 does not appear so important around 
the size threshold is correlated to the fact that firms - around the employment 
threshold- may use more intensively other form of labour contracts, more flexible 
ones, or even hire in the black market in order to avoid crossing the threshold without 
being subject to the provision of Article 18. 
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Although the right to reinstatement is a hotly debated issue in Italy and very 
much central to the platform of the social partners, its impact remains unclear in a 
labour market where less than 50 per cent of the employees work in companies with 
more than 15 employees (Figure 25) and the percentage of self-employed is more 
than one order of magnitude larger than in France and Germany (Figure 26a). Most 
noticeably, workers hired under the contratto a progetto introduced in 2003 by the 
legge Biagi as the most flexible, “atypical”, labour contract, are categorized as self-
employed even in cases when they have had only one employer for few subsequent 
years. 
 
Figure 25   Share of employment by firm size 
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Figure 26a  Self-employment rate 
 
 
The new legislation introduced by the Monti government and approved by the 
parliament under the label Fornero Reform before the summer 2012 has reduced the 
likelihood of an automatic reinstatement clause and gives to the judge the option of 
choosing between a full reinstatement or a monetary compensation equivalent to 15 
month of the dismissed worker. Before the Fornero Reform, the choice was in the 
hands of the employee. As of June 2012, the choice will be in the hand of a judge, 
though in some specific cases the judge has limited choices. The system is certainly 
very complex.  As we mentioned above, it is still too early to evaluate whether the 
reform will have any impact, but it is clear that the uncertainty of the dismissal 
procedure- particularly serious in the case of Italy where the labour-trials can last 
more than few years-is still extremely pervasive in the new legislation.  
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4. Labour Market Segmentation and its Implications 
for Job Quality 
The duality of the Italian labour market is apparent as it divides the labour force 
into two sizeable different groups, defined in terms of job security - measured by the 
duration of employment - compensation and likelihood of receiving on-the-job 
training. This is not a phenomenon limited to Italy: in most EU Member States, the 
proportion of young people in employment who are working in temporary jobs is very 
high, especially among those under 25 years of age where 40 per cent are in this 
position. However, this general statistic does not elicit the large cross-country 
heterogeneity as the share of temporary employment among workers from age 15 to 
24 ranges from more than 50 per cent in SI, PL, DE, ES, PT, SE and FR to less than 
20 per cent in CZ, CY, SK, UK, MT, LV, BG, LT and RO.  This cross-country 
heterogeneity has remained somewhat unaffected by the current crisis when we 
compare 2007 with 2011, as Table 1 shows. 
Table 1   Fraction of temporary contracts in percentage of total employees by age before and during crisis time 
Country between 15 and 24 between 25 and 49 between 50 and 64 between 15 and 64 
 2007 2011 2007 2011 2007 2011 2007 2011 
Austria 34.9 37.2 4.7 5.6 2.5 2.4 8.9 9.6 
Belgium 31.6 34.3 6.9 7.5 4.3 3.8 8.6 8.9 
Bulgaria 10.3 8.3 4.5 3.6 5.0 4.3 5.1 4.1 
Cyprus 23.3 17.2 14.0 15.6 5.2 6.2 13.3 13.7 
Czech Republic 17.4 22.3 5.8 6.9 9.5 6.8 7.8 8.0 
Denmark 22.5 22.1 7.4 7.6 4.3 3.5 9.0 8.9 
Estonia  13.8  3.4  3.4 2.2 4.5 
Finland 42.4 43.4 14.1 14.3 7.6 6.9 15.9 15.5 
France 53.5 55.0 12.0 12.3 6.9 7.5 15.0 15.2 
Germany 57.4 56.0 9.9 11.0 4.7 4.8 14.7 14.8 
Greece 27.0 30.1 10.5 11.5 6.1 7.4 10.9 11.6 
Hungary 19.1 22.9 6.8 8.5 4.8 6.5 7.3 8.9 
Ireland 20.5 34.2 5.5 7.8 4.6 5.9 8.0 9.9 
Italy 42.3        
Latvia 9.3 10.7 3.5 5.9 3.2 6.5 4.2 6.5 
Lithuania 9.8 9.1 2.9 2.5 2.9 1.9 3.5 2.8 
Luxembourg 34.1 34.5 5.6 6.2  3.0 6.8 7.1 
Malta 11.0 17.7 3.8 4.3   5.1 6.5 
Netherlands 45.1 47.7 14.1 14.5 6.8 6.8 17.9 18.2 
Poland 65.7 65.6 25.1 25.1 18.2 17.6 28.2 26.9 
Portugal 52.6 57.2 21.1 21.7 10.6 11.0 22.4 22.2 
Romania 4.6 5.8 1.4 1.4 0.9 0.8 1.6 1.5 
Slovakia 13.7 18.6 3.9 5.7 4.0 5.2 5.0 6.5 
Slovenia 68.3 74.5 14.0 14.7 6.7 7.5 18.4 18.0 
Spain 62.8 61.4 31.0 26.3 15.3 11.7 31.7 25.4 
Sweden 57.1 57.3 14.0 12.3 7.3 6.0 17.2 15.9 
UK 13.3 13.5 4.3 4.9 4.3 4.6 5.7 6.0 
EU27 41.3 42.5 12.4 12.4 6.9 6.7 14.6 14.0 
Source: EUROSTAT 
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In Italy, the upward trend toward temporary contracts has been steady. 
Figure 26b shows how the percentage of temporary and fixed term employees has 
increased from 5 per cent to 14 per cent during the period that started in 1990 and 
finished in 2008. In addition, also the number of self-employed remains substantially 
larger in Italy than in the rest of Europe. 
Figure 26b   Employees with temporary contracts 
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These percentages are especially imbalanced across generations. Comparing 
the share of temporary workers by age groups (Figures 27a, 27b, 27c and 27d) 
between before (2006) and after the crisis (2011), we find that the share of temporary 
workers over total employment has increased by more than 20 per cent for workers 
under 28 years old, by less than 10 per cent for workers from 28 to 37 years old, and 
only by less than 5 per cent in the other age classes. This evidence is consistent with 
the view that, as total number of people employed fell during the period (Figure 27e), 
while both young and old workers were laid off because of the crisis, some of the 
young workers were hired back but only as temporary workers while older workers 
had seen a much lower chance of being hired back.  
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Figure 27a   Employment by type of contract (15-27) 
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Source: EU LFS  1983-2011 
 
Figure 27b   Employment by type of contract (27-37) 
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31 
 
Figure 27c   Employment by type of contract (37-52) 
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Figure 27d   Employment by type of contract (52-64) 
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Figure 27e   Number of people employed and employees  
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Boeri (2010) and Bentolila (2010) argue that, in general, “the widespread use of 
temporary contracts, resulting from two-tier EPL reforms, increases the business 
cycle volatility of employment. There is a considerable body of evidence suggesting 
that the young, the least educated and ethnic minorities are more severely hit during 
downturns, while young people do especially well in upturns.” Moreover, 
“Blanchflower and Freeman (2000) identified the disproportionate large response of 
youth employment and unemployment to changes in overall labour market conditions. 
The sensitivity of the labour market for young people to changes in the economic 
cycle tends to dominate the effects of any sizeable demographic (e.g. smaller cohorts) 
and structural changes (e.g. better educated) effects which tend to be favourable to 
youth employment in general compared to other age groups” (Employment in Europe 
(2010)).  
These findings imply that, during recessions, the share of young and temporary 
workers among jobless people increases. This is consistent with evidence reported in 
Figure 28. This shows the reduction of job-to-job transitions during recessions.  
33 
Figure 28   Job-to-job transitions 
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   Source: EU LFS  1983-2011  
Moreover, temporary workers also have to compete for a reduced number of job 
vacancies with better qualified job-seekers with more stable employment histories, 
and who might also have been made redundant, particularly in deep recessions like 
the current one. As better-qualified workers are likely to be preferred by firms making 
recruitments decisions, dismissed temporary workers have a significantly higher risk 
of becoming long-term unemployed following an economic downturn. Consistent 
with this view, Figure 29 shows how, during the recession of 2009, it was the flow of 
workers out of unemployment to fall more than the flow into unemployment that 
increased. 
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Figure 29   Flow in/out of unemployment 
 
Source : EU LFS 1983-2008, 2009 
 
The effect of temporary jobs on long-term unemployment is also liable to be 
exacerbated by lack of eligibility for income safety nets in case of job loss due to too 
short or intermittent work histories (OECD, 2009). An indicator of the difficulty that 
workers may find in benefitting from unemployment insurance and safety net can be 
found by looking at the distribution of duration in employment. Figure 30 provides 
this evidence regarding the Italian Labour market where employees are distinguished 
by the duration of their current employment. Although we do not know whether 
employees with less than 2 years on the job have had previous working experience, it 
is unlikely that as much as 26 per cent of the employees in 2008 – those who have 
had been at their job for 2 years or less – are first-time employees. It is likely that, 
within this group of people, individuals have experienced discontinuous coverage by 
unemployment insurance, as the Italian labour market regulation does not guarantee 
unemployment benefit to workers that have been employed less than 1 year in the last 
two. 
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Figure 30   Employment rate by tenure at current employer 
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We know that different unemployment rates, like the ones we observed for 
Italian youth, women and Southeners (Figures 5, 6, 9 and 17 respectively) are 
responsible for differences in the perceived insecurity of workers, an important 
determinant of youth behaviour. The European Commission noted
9
 that “survey data 
allow to measure insecurity in terms of the perceived probability of being 
unemployed (or losing the current job). The fear of unemployment is found to 
increase with age, with a history of previous unemployment, with having a temporary 
or part-time contract, as well as with the level of regional unemployment (Green et 
al., 2001).”  
Another important adverse effect of dual labour markets comes through wage 
pressure. Boeri (2010) argues that higher number of temporary workers increases the 
bargaining position of permanent employees if trade unions bargain with the 
objectives of maximizing the interests of the latter group.  
With the exception of Austria, Denmark, Germany and possibly France, only 
small percentage of workers that combine education and work do so while under a 
temporary contract. Given the increasing role played by temporary and part-time jobs 
as entry modes into employment, there are growing concerns about the possibility for 
young people to transition into more stable and well-paid jobs, using temporary or 
low-paid jobs as stepping-stones. As far as working income is concerned, Quintini 
 
9
 Chapter 3, Employment in Europe 2010, European Commission. 
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and Martin (2006) show that young workers with discontinuous or absent work 
experience are more likely to receive low wages. The likelihood of working for an 
hourly wage that is 2/3 of the median wage is greater for workers in the youth. 
However, employing ECHP
10
 data between 1995 and 2001, they show that the 
likelihood of low pay falls over time and exit rates from low salary jobs are higher 
than exit rates from non-employment. This evidence suggests that it remains “better 
(for career progression) to be working in a low-paid job than to have no job at all.”11 
This is suggestive of the fact that temporary contracts serve as a valid entry in 
the labour market and provide a path to stable employment if they are linked to an 
opportunity of professional development in the form of education and or training. The 
pay is not the only, and possibly not even the most important, indicator of job 
satisfaction, especially at the beginning of the working career. Another fundamental 
feature is the amount of training received on the job. Especially with temporary 
contract, low pay can be considered a negligible factor if the amount of training 
conveyed through these contracts were considerable. Using ECHP data, Boeri (2010) 
provides relevant and disappointing evidence in this respect. Figure 31 documents 
that firms provide considerable less education or training opportunities to temporary 
workers than they do to permanent workers.   
 
Figure 31   Education or training provided to the employed 
 
                  Source: Boeri (2010) based on the ECHP 
 
Our analysis of LFS data of more recent Italian data seems to confirm Boeri’s 
findings. Figure 32 shows that the unconditional probability of receiving on-the-job 
training self-reported by the employee is twice as much under regular contract in 
comparison with temporary contract. 
 
10
 European Community Household Panel.  
11
 Chapter 3, Employment in Europe, 2010 
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Figure 32   On-the-job training 
 
Source: EU LFS 1983-2011 
 
Table 2 provides a more detailed account. The difference in the probability to 
receive training at the workplace between temporary and permanent workers is 
smaller for men than for women, larger for individuals with higher education a 
residing in the South and, more interestingly, smaller for young workers (within 27 
years old) than for older workers. This last fact suggests that, while temporary 
contracts may provide a valid entry to the labour market used to screen workers that 
are trained during their employment, they serve a completely different purpose at later 
age. In fact among workers older than 27 years old, the incidence of on-the-job 
training differs drastically between temporary and permanent workers. 
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Table 2   Fraction of workers receiving on-the-job training as percentage of the reference group 
On-the-Job 
Training, 2011  
Employment Relationship 
  
Family 
Work 
Self-
Employed 
Temporary 
Contract 
Permanent 
Contract 
Age 
15≤Age≤27 0.01% 0.22% 0.50% 0.57% 
27<Age≤37 0.01% 0.53% 0.12% 1.27% 
37<Age≤52 0.00% 0.50% 0.06% 1.78% 
52<Age≤64 0.00% 0.39% 0.03% 1.37% 
Gender 
Male 0.01% 0.54% 0.09% 1.35% 
Female 0.01% 0.34% 0.17% 1.54% 
Education Level* 
Lower 
Secondary 
0.01% 0.16% 0.03% 0.44% 
Upper 
Secondary 
0.01% 0.43% 0.09% 1.72% 
Tertiary 0.01% 1.49% 0.30% 3.57% 
Region 
North 0.01% 0.48% 0.16% 1.76% 
Central 0.89% 0.00% 0.56% 0.12% 
South & Islands 0.00% 0.35% 0.06% 0.89% 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey, Eurostat 
 
It is almost self-evident that, at the current level of dualism in the Italian labour 
market, the discrepancies between the probability to receive on-the-job training across 
temporary and permanent workers persist and are strong. The challenge for policy 
remains to reduce the underlying dualism. We turn to this issue in the following 
section by discussing the Single Contract proposal.    
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5.  A Proposal Affecting the Linkage between Duality 
and Labour Market  
5.1. Outcomes: the Single Contract  
We presented above the last wave of reforms that have just been approved in 
Italy. The difficult employment situation for many young workers, clearly associated 
to the dual structure of the labour market in many European countries, calls for 
additional policy action. This is because, as we argued above, in the Italian labour 
market there are still unresolved problems related to the stabilization of temporary 
workers. In this setting and at this stage of the economic crisis, simply phasing out or 
dismantling temporary contracts would be a tremendous mistake for a variety of 
reasons. First, temporary contracts clearly contributed to the employment gains prior 
to the crisis. Second, and most importantly, phasing out temporary contracts now 
could give us the worse of all possible worlds, with large job losses experienced 
during the great recession without the large job gains if the recovery were to become 
reality. 
An effective reform should balance two different forces that, at first, are moving 
in opposite directions. On the one hand, we need to facilitate the transformation of the 
productive structure by letting firms enjoy flexibility at entry. As we already 
mentioned, on the labour demand side, firms benefits from a labour market where 
experimentation is allowed.  Temporary contracts do represent a form of 
experimentation with respect to the quality of the labour market match.  Hiring labour 
is a form of investment, and labour is a quasi-fixed factor of production. Temporary 
contracts reduce the fixed cost component associated with labour and are thus 
welcome. On the other hand, a reform effective at addressing the dual labour market 
should try to provide workers with a well-defined path to employment stability and 
satisfaction. Workers do benefit from a labour market in which there is a clearly 
defined long-term employment prospect. Open-ended contract are an obvious way to 
guarantee workers such a long-run entrance. 
The policy proposal for balancing these two opposite forces is the so called 
single contract, an open-ended contract where employment protection increases with 
worker’s tenure. In other words, with a single contract workers would be hired under 
a long-term, open-ended contract. However, employment protection would be 
initially mild, only to smoothly increase as the worker increases tenure. Ideally, the 
protection should increase smoothly. 
The proposal of a single contract is currently being considered in different 
countries. In Spain one hundred academic economists drafted a bill. In France 
Blanchard and Tirole (2006) and Cahuc Kramarz (2004) and in Spain Bentolila 
(2010) propose a similar scheme. The idea behind a single contract for the Italian 
legislation is based on the policy proposal of Boeri and Garibaldi (2008). In Italy, 
Boeri and Garibaldi (2008) extensively argued a proposal of contratto unico and other 
reforms to contrast the dualism present in the labour market. There is a common 
philosophy in all these proposals across countries, even though the structure is 
tailored to country specific regulations.  
The basic idea is based on an open ended contract with protection increasing 
with tenure. For the case of Italy, the single contract aims at introducing a contract 
with no termination composed of two phases: an entry phase and a stability phase. 
The entry phase is the initial one and lasts three years. During this phase firms may 
lay off workers but, differently from current temporary contracts, the worker has the 
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right to severance payments proportional to tenure: dismissal without just cause 
requires up to 6 months in severance payments (Figure 34). In the stability phase that 
follows, the existing legislation comes in place.  
In 2010 a draft bill submitted to Italian parliament outlined the legislative details 
behind the policy proposal. The Contratto Unico d’Inserimento (as the draft bill 
called the new contract) is a fully open ended labour contract that envisages two 
different phases (see Figure 33 for reference). The entry phase lasts up to three years 
and -during such period- the firm is entitled to dismiss the worker for economic 
reasons against a monetary compensation that increases by 5 days per month of tenure 
and reaches 6 months after three years. During such period the reinstatement clause of 
the article 18 does not apply. In the confirmation phase, the traditional employment 
protection legislation applies.  
 
Figure 33   Contratto Unico d’Inserimento 
 
The draft bill specifies also that fixed term contracts should be kept in place only 
for very specific tasks (such as purely seasonal jobs, substitution for maternity leave, 
etc.). With respect to other form of flexible labour contracts (particularly the so called 
contratto a progetto), the draft bill does not envisage their full elimination, as some of 
the opponents of the proposal wrongly argue. Nevertheless, the draft bill specifies that 
any form of dependent contract for relatively low and midlow salaries should be 
automatically transformed into the single contract. The rationale for such clause is the 
fact that very flexible labour contract should be perfectly legitimate as long as they 
apply to relatively high salaries.  
The single contract has been thoroughly discussed in the Italian policy debate. 
The discussion and potential criticism comes- for opposite reasons- from two main 
sources: one from the employer associations and the other from the unions. The 
employer association finds somewhat too restrictive the idea of having a single main 
form of entry into the labour market.  Unions, on the other hand, argue that the three 
years period in the entry phase is far too long and should probably be reduced. This 
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discussion makes clear that a compromise between these two positions is certainly 
feasible via parliament discussion and- further- shows that a single contract is 
potentially compatible with the incentives of both employers and workers. 
In addition, various policy players (from politicians to social actor) argue that 
apprenticeships- rather than the single contract- should be the main entry road into the 
labour market. A properly designed apprenticeship system can certainly be a viable 
way for entering the labour market. Yet in the Italian legislation, the apprenticeship 
legislation faces various problems. First, it applies only to young workers.  Second, in 
the existing form a firm has the right to freely dismiss the worker at the end of the 
three year apprenticeships. In addition, it involves costly subsidies in the form of 
reduced social contributions. 
An additional position in the policy debate is that dualism should be dealt with 
via a subsidy to hire workers under a permanent contract. There are two main 
problems with such a proposal. First, similar policies were introduced in 2002 and 
2003 and turned out to have very limited impact, as most of the subsidy seemed to 
end up to workers that would have been hired permanently even without the subsidy 
(Cipollone  Guelfi et al. 2006). Second, and more importantly, the proposal has fiscal 
implications in terms of increased spending. The single contract, conversely, does not 
imply any direct cost for the Italian public budget. 
The proposal of the contratto unico is a compromise between the stated 
objectives. First, we have seen that the degree of skill mismatch is persistently high in 
the European Union. The proposal aims to allow firms to enjoy flexibility to identify 
the most fitting candidate, but it offers this benefit only in exchange for a 
compensation to the worker (i.e. additional severance payment) if this flexibility does 
not lead to employment stabilization. Second, by introducing an additional cost on 
firms during the entry phase, it builds an incentive for firms to invest in the worker’s 
training and foster his productivity. Under the single contract, the employer would 
find it less convenient than today to “fire and hire” at will a new different temporary 
worker. This would become a relatively more costly activity that the alternative of 
identifying the right person for the job and training him/her appropriately. 
The proposal of the single contract is universal. With the exception of seasonal 
workers or few specific tasks, fixed term workers should then become a much more 
narrowly defined group in the labour market. The idea is that they should be allowed 
only for specific tasks that are genuinely temporary or “high pay jobs”. Policy makers 
should thus not focus on job security for high income workers. In addition, during the 
transition, firms who hired on fixed term and later converted into contratto unico 
would forgo the entry phase.  
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6. Conclusions  
The possibly most pressing economic problem in Europe is low economic 
growth in the medium run. Yet, in the aftermath of the great 2008-09 recession, a new 
social challenge in Europe emerged. Almost 6 million young people under 25 years 
old are unemployed in the EU 27. In Italy more than one out of three young people 
(between age 15 and 24) are currently without a job. Double digit youth 
unemployment is a common feature to most European countries but it is especially 
high in Italy. In addition to Youth unemployment, the Italian economy is plagued by 
considerable gender and regional differences in unemployment and employment 
rates. 
During past decades, reforms of employment protection legislation (EPL) 
introduced in European countries have often been ‘partial’ or ‘two-tier’, i.e. they have 
allowed a more flexible use of temporary contracts while they have mostly kept 
unchanged the firing rules for permanent contract. The reforms EPL have therefore 
been asymmetric. A consensus has been reached that two-tier reforms have initially 
delivered sizeable increase in employment, especially temporary and, at alter stage, 
they have led to the creation of a dual labour markets split between permanent 
employees (‘insiders’) with stable employment and certain career and earnings 
prospects, and another for temporary employees (or ‘outsiders’) who risk to be 
‘trapped’ into temporary jobs. This is, unfortunately, an accurate description of the 
Italian labour market. 
Many European economies use temporary contracts as an important means of 
hiring. This is particularly the case with young workers where temporary positions are 
around 40 per cent of total dependent employment (see Table 1), a much larger level 
than the one observed in the total working-age population. Temporary jobs can fulfil 
a number of functions. They can provide a “screening” device allowing firms to 
evaluate workers' ability/adequacy for the job. In this line, temporary jobs can act as a 
“gateway” to the labour market and as potential “stepping stones” to more stable and 
better paid jobs. Otherwise, temporary contracts can simply be a convenient way for 
firms to cut labour costs by increasing (cheaper) temporary workers while they 
decrease the number of (more expensive) permanent employees. The Italian evidence 
supports the view that the second function may in fact be quite relevant in practise.  
In addition, young workers, especially the one employed in temporary contracts, 
fail to acquire the skills necessary to accommodate the transformation of the 
European economy. The skill mismatch is increasing in Europe and in Italy 
(European Commission (2012)), although positive examples remain (e.g. Austria and 
Germany). This is particularly the case in those labour markets where temporary 
workers are less likely to be stabilized in their employment conditions. Looking at 
Italy, we have confirmed that temporary workers receive less training on-the-job as 
the nature of their employment reduces the incentive to invest in firm-specific human 
capital. 
Temporary workers in general and youth in particular are especially hard-hit 
during the current crisis. Low conversion rates of temporary into permanent jobs 
discourage the work effort of temporary workers, prevent the accumulation of 
professional skills and delay the overall transformation of the European economy. 
Besides providing a large number of facts to gain a thorough picture of the Italian 
labour market, this paper argues in favour of the Single Contract - a proposal aimed at 
reducing the duality of the Italian labour market.  
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